Proceedings of the 53rd Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences | 2020

Assessing Mission Performance for Technology Reliant Missions
Noah DeMoes
MIT Lincoln Laboratory
noah.demoes@ll.mit.edu

Trang Nguyen
MIT Lincoln Laboratory
trang.nguyen@ll.mit.edu

Abstract
Operators today increasingly rely on technology
to accomplish objectives. Although technology can
increase mission success and efficiency in a majority of
operations, it can simultaneously increase vulnerability
prevalence, resulting in a higher exploitation likelihood.
Defense methods have been proposed and evaluated
based on their ability to ensure network security.
However, these evaluation metrics do not fully
quantify how network exploitation impacts mission task
completion. Our mission performance model links
cyber devices to mission tasks utilizing a missions
mission map and evaluates a missions performance
as the proportion of completed mission tasks in an
agent based simulation. Our model allows for mission
mappings with varying degrees of completion to enable
a generic and adaptable model. We investigate the
impact differing levels of mission map completion
have on the mission performance metric for the same
mission. Experiments serve to provide quantitative
assessment for mission performance in cyber-network
mission systems.

1.

Introduction

The reliance on technology in todays operational
environment lowers the barrier for adversaries to
conduct cyber-attacks through network vulnerability
exploitation.
A cyber attack is an attack, via
cyberspace, targeting an enterprises use of cyberspace
for the purpose of disrupting, disabling, destroying,
or maliciously controlling a computing environment/
infrastructure [1].
In 2017 alone, the Internet
Crime Complaint Center received a total of 301,580
cyber-attack complaints that resulted in over $1.4 billion
in reported losses [2]. Several companies have created
and published various methods to mitigate cyber attack
impact that either prevent cyber-attacks from occurring
or mitigate the effects of a cyber intrusion [3] [4] and
[5]. However, a gap exists in the quantitative evaluation
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of mitigation technique effectiveness.
Mitigation technique effectiveness is a measure
of a mitigation techniques ability to stop potential
attacks, slow intrusion damage, prevent mission
delay, or increase mission performance.
Mission
performance is the proportion of completed tasks to
the total number of mission tasks. There are several
metrics used to represent mitigation effectiveness, such
as security index, mission delay, and maintenance
cost. For example, Wagner introduces a risk score
for mission effectiveness for network segmentation
that combines security index, mission delay and
maintenance cost [6].
Although the risk score
provides insight into a defense mitigation techniques
ability to reduce risk to the network, it does not
identify which mission tasks are affected by a
specific device being compromised. Metrics like risk
score measure a networks ability to defend against
cyber-attacks, but do not provide a measurement of
the mitigation techniques ability to enable mission
objective completion. Without metrics that incorporate
mission mappings to evaluate and rank each mitigation
tool based on mission task completion, practitioners
default to expert knowledge or personal experience to
determine method implementation. Mission mapping
is the process of identifying and linking each mission
tasks cyber dependencies, the network topology, and the
probability of compromise (POC) for each cyber asset.
Additionally, network security is not the end state for
most practitioners, but a means to accomplish mission
objectives. Thus, mitigation technique effectiveness
is synonymous with mission performance. Mission
accomplishment relies on users, devices, and services
working in tandem to accomplish all tasks users are
assigned. Accordingly, any metric measuring mitigation
effectiveness should consider the accomplishment of
mission objectives in the context of the entire mission
map as part of mission performance.
It is important to note that a cyber mission map
contains users, devices, services, and mission tasks as
well as probabilities of compromise (POC) for each
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device, user and service [7]. In this paper, when
referencing users, devices and services together the
word mission entities will be used. In the presence
of the same mission map, mission entities will be
compromised based on their POC. Thus, numerous
tests are required to compute the expected outcome for
mission performance for a given cyber mission map.
Real-world implementation has high financial and time
costs.
In this work we propose a novel mission
performance metric that incorporates a missions
mission mapping to compute the expected proportion
of completed mission tasks. This metric differs from
current metrics by reducing the network entities used to
evaluate mission performance to only mission entities.
Utilizing only mission entities results in a more specific
mission performance metric over current methods. Our
mission performance model is an adaptable simulation
model that enables varying mission mapping types. In
this paper, we evaluate the results for differing levels of
information for mission maps by comparing the mission
performance output for different mission mappings of
the same mission.

2.
2.1.

Related Work
Mission Mapping

A mission map is a directional dependency graph
of mission assets and network assets that informs
decision makers on how to optimize resource allocation
and adjust network architecture to best achieve results
by identifying Cyber Key Terrain (CKT). There have
been several technologies developed to create mission
mapping. Some are fully autonomous, while some
remain fully manual. An exhaustive survey exists here
[8]. Schulz found that no technology exists that is
fully automated while fully manual methods of mission
mapping are effective and focus should be spent on
mapping network capabilities.
Jeffery Guion focuses on creating a mission mapping
that is mission oriented and not IT focused. Guion
provides a framework on how to approach the problem
and a dynamic mission mapping solution, but does not
identify the features required to identify CKT [9].
Cyber Assets to Mission and Users (CAMUS) was
created to map assets to mission devices with decent
performance. It requires a large database of data
in order to gather relationships, but does not include
relationship metrics [10]. A study of using density
of communications and common neighbors to identify
mission devices on a network is presented in [11].
Mission mapping is a problem that has, yet to be fully

solved. Current solutions yield mission maps that are
either too static to be effective and distributable, or too
generic to draw significant conclusions [12]. While
this research focuses on mission mapping, it does not
evaluates the ability to mission mapping nor the impact
a mission map has on informing mission performance.
In this paper we take a full, semi, or no mission map
and evaluate the mission performance given the current
mission map.

2.2.

Mission Impact Metrics

A study that evaluates segmentation architecture
utilizing a continuous Markov chain to model changes
in network states is provided in [7]. A modularized
hierarchical simulation framework to model a complete
cyber system and evaluate the effectiveness of
network-level mitigation techniques using security
and mission impact metrics is demonstrated in [13]. An
agent-based simulation is created to find the optimal
network segmentation based on mission delay and
security is found in [14]. A hybrid approach using
nature-inspired optimization and cyber risk modeling
and simulation created candidate network architectures
based on security, cost, and mission performance
metrics is found in [6].
Although applicable for network segmentation,
the metrics found in these papers do not extend
to other mitigations. In this paper we provide a
mission performance metric that is agnostic to a
mitigation techniques, making it adaptable and generic.
Additionally, current methods measure mission impact
as a function of the entire network.
However,
missions exist in which an entire network is not
necessary for mission accomplishment. In such cases,
if network entities that are unrelated to a mission are
unavailable, current mission impact metrics incorporate
this unavailability into mission performance, lowering
its score, even though these entities do not play a
role in this mission. Our mission performance model
determines which network entities are mission critical
through a missions mission mapping and evaluates
performance based only on mission dependent entities.

3.

Modeling Mission Performance

A mission map is a directed graph in which a
mission model is mapped to a network graph. A
mission model is a directed graph that depicts the tasks
and non-cyber mission entities needed for a mission.
The resulting mission map contains the mission tasks
and each tasks non-cyber and cyber mission entities.
This graph contains the following mission entities:
mission tasks, users, devices, resources, and services as
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nodes. Examples of mission entities include: humans,
computers, servers, data, and software. Edges represent
dependencies and are weighted with a source nodes
mission capacity, the maximum number of mission tasks
a node can complete.
Additionally, we define both soft and hard
constraints for mission mappings that are informed
by specific mission objective requirements. A soft
constraint is a mission requirement that when unsatisfied
results in a failure for the task dependent on that specific
requirement. Although, that mission task failed, the
mission can continue or still be semi-completed. A
mission hard constraint is a mission requirement that
must be satisfied to complete any part of the mission.
If a mission hard constraint is violated, the mission
performance automatically becomes zero. Mission
mapping provides a methodology to identify soft and
hard mission constraints.

3.1.

Mission Entities

A mission device is any hardware that is required
to complete a mission. Mission users are entities
that use mission. A mission service is any software
service needed to complete a mission. A mission
resource is information or items needed to complete
a mission. Devices can also store resources that are
accessed through connections in services. For example,
the Air Forces Air Operations Center (AOC) gathers and
processes flight plans for air missions. In this example,
the mission devices are MAAP Server, ATO Server,
and the mission user are computers. Additionally, a
device has a compromise rate that is a result of cleansing
rate, patch rate, vulnerability rate, and exploitation
rate parameters [7]. We utilize the probability of
compromise results from Wagner as the probability of
compromise for devices [7].
A mission user is an individual tasked to complete
the mission. Mission users are constrained by the
training that they have fulfilled.
Some mission
users are specialists and can only accomplish specific
mission while other mission users are general users
that can perform variety of mission tasks. Mission
user information is provided from the mission model
because they are non-cyber assets. The probability of
compromise for cyber assets represents the likelihood
that an asset is unavailable.
Similarly, mission
users become unavailable when absent from their job.
Military members are afforded 2.5 days of leave per
month. The probability that a member is absent from
work on a given day is 0.0833, the number of leave days
divided by 30. For the purpose of uniformity we will
define the probability of absence for a mission user as a

mission users probability of compromise. Mission users
are connected to mission tasks through mission devices
and services. Mission user capacity is a measure of the
number of mission tasks a user is able to perform within
the duration of the mission.
A resource is a packet of information needed to
complete the mission. Air traffic orders are an example
of a resource in the AOC example. Resources are
connected to tasks through connections to devices and
services. We assume that resources can be accessed
at any time and that they are readily available. Based
on this assumption resources do not have a capacity.
Resources are assumed to be compromised if the device
they are located in is compromised.
A services is software used to communicate between
hardware. Some mission tasks require specific software.
Other times, multiple software packages can accomplish
the task. For example, if a mission task is to send a
document between individuals, users could use email,
deposit it on a shared server, or upload to the cloud.
Services connect to tasks based on the software needed
to complete the mission. The probability of compromise
of a services is taken from [7].
A mission task is the final mission entity and is a
job that is to be completed to meet mission objectives
that requires a combination of users, devices, resources
and services. Some mission tasks are dependent on
other mission tasks. For example, in order for an air
traffic order to be issued a master air attack plan must be
completed.

3.2.

Mapping Mission Entities

Traditionally mission mappings are created only
when the complete mapping is known. If a full
mission mapping with complete network structure is
provided, connections are formed based on its depiction.
However, this information is rarely available in an
appropriate time frame. To mitigate this cost we
propose a method to create partial mission mapping.
When partial information is known about the mission
map, the remaining information is approximated using
probability distributions and Monte Carlo simulation.
For example, the POC for each of the mission entities
is unknown. To determine these probabilities users can
search for average exploitation rates for hardware and
software to approximate for the POC for devices and
services, respectively. If a semi-full mission mapping
is provided the full mission mapping must be created
by connecting mission entities to mission tasks based on
probabilities of connection and utilizing simulation.
Traditionally, mission mapping is represented by
dependency graphs as displayed in Figure 1. The
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independent mission entities are on the bottom level
and subsequent levels represent the next entity that is
dependent until the mission is achieved. This depiction
is beneficial for visually identifying dependent entities
for in small mission mappings, but makes it more costly
to identify when mission tasks fail. In the case of large
mission mappings the advantage of visual representation
is diminished and mission task failure identification
remains challenging.

3.3.

Mission Performance Metric

In addition to connectivity, each mission entity has
both soft and hard constraint characteristics. The
constraints are defined by the mission requirements.
Soft constraints represent uniformity and adaptability
for a given entity. For example, a soft constraint for
devices is that at least one device must be used to
complete mission task 1. The device need to complete
the mission is left unspecified which increases the
flexibility of the task. In contrast, a hard constraint
represents a constraint that must be satisfied in order
for the mission to be completed. For example, user 1
must be used to complete mission task 4 to accomplish
the mission is a hard constraint because if user 1 cannot
complete mission task 4 then the mission fails.
The final score for mission performance is the
minimum between soft constraint mission performance
(SCM P ) and hard constraint mission performance
(HCM P ). If any hard constraint is violated, HCM P
receives a score of 0 and mission performance is 0.
This makes sense because hard constraints represent
requirements that must be completed to perform the
mission. If one of those requirements is not fulfilled
then the mission does not run. On the other hand, if no
hard constraints are violated, then HCM P is one and
the minimum between HCM P and SCM P is SCM P .

Figure 1. A traditional mission map.

To mitigate this disadvantage, we created a different
mission map representation. We define a mission task i,
as failed when any dependent mission entity for mission
task i are compromised or unreachable. To quickly
identify when a mission task fails, we map mission
entities to mission tasks only. Thus, we simply look at
the entities attached to a given mission task to see if they
have been compromised. If they have, then we know
that that mission task cannot be complete. The benefit is
a more efficient method to determine connectivity with
respect to mission tasks. Figure 2 provides an example
of the new style of a mission map.

Figure 2. Our adaptive mission map.

Soft constraint mission task
(SCM T P ) measures the mission

performance
performance
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given that no hard constraints were violated. Table 2
displays categories that influence mission performance
and their corresponding soft constraints. The categories
are time, order, adaptability, accessibility, and usability.
These categories were selected because each one
defines the availability of a mission entities. Time
and order measure a tasks ability to be accomplished.
Adaptability measures the availability of services.
Accessibility measures the availability of resources.
Usability measures the availability of users and devices
because users are attached to devices to connect to the
network. SCM T P is calculated for task i:
SCM T P (ti ) = min{T (ti ), O(ti ), A(ti ),
AC(ti ), U (ti ), }
where T (t i) is the time score, O(ti ) is the order
score, A(ti ) is the adaptability score, AC(ti ) is the
accessibility score and U (ti ) is the usability score for
soft constraints for task i. Each score is either 0 if the
soft constraint is violated or 1 if the soft constraint is
not violated. Thus, SCM T P (ti ) is only 1 or 0. The
SCM P for the entire mission is:
Pn
SCT M P (ti )
SCM P = i=1
n
which is a value between 0 and 1.
Table 1. Mission performance hard constraints.
Category
Hard Constraint
Time T(ti )
If the total time to complete all
tasks exceeds the total mission time
constraint, HCE=0. If the time score
for a mission essential task is 0,
HCE=0; else HCE=1.
Order O(ti ) If there exists a mission essential
task that is dependent and its order
score is 0; HCO=0; else HCO=1.
Adaptability If the availability score of a mission
A(ti )
essential task is 0, HCA=0; else
HCA=1.
Accessibility If the accessibility score of a mission
AC(ti )
essential task is 0, HCAC=0; else
HCAC=1.
Usability
If the usability score of a mission
U(ti )
essential task is 0; HCU=0; else
HCU=1.

Hard Constraint mission performance (HCM P )
measures whether or not the mission fails by identifying
which mission entities violate any hard constraints.
Table 1 provides a summary of the mission performance
hard constraints. Categories are selected based on the
same methodology as the soft constraint methodology.
HCM T P is calculated for task i:

HCM T P (ti ) = min{T (ti ), O(ti ), A(ti ),
AC(ti ), U (ti )},
where T (ti ) is the time score, O(ti ) is the order
score, A(ti ) is the adaptability score, AC(ti ) is the
accessibility score and U (ti ) is the usability score for
hard constraints for task i. If any HCM T P is 0, the
HCM P is 0, else HCM P is 1. Table 1 provides a
summary of the mission performance hard constraints.
Table 2. Mission performance
Category
Soft Constraint
Level 1
Time T(ti )
Unrestricted time
tasks
receive
time score of 1.
Order O(ti )

Independent
tasks receive an
order score of 1.

Adaptability
A(ti )

If
at
least
one service is
available
and
connected to a
task, score of 1.
Else score of 0.
Accessibility If there exists
AC(ti )
a path between
the task and
resources needed
for the task,
accessibility
score of 1. Else
score of 0.
Usability
If at least one
U(ti )
user is connected
to a mission task,
usability score of
1; else usability
score of 0.

soft constraints.
Soft Constraint
Level 2
Time tasks that
exceed constraint
receive
time
score of 0.
Dependent tasks
receive an order
score of 1 if all
their dependent
tasks have an
order score of 1.
Else score of 0.
If the one service
is available and
connected to the
task, score of 1.
Else score of 0.
If there exists
a path between
the task and
resources needed
for the task,
accessibility
score of 1. Else
score of 0.
If at least one
user capable of
completing the
task is connected
to
the
task,
usability score of
1 else usability
score of 0.

Thus, mission performance is the minimum between
SCM P and HCM P .

3.4.

Mission Simulation

It is too costly to compute mission performance
using test beds. An event-based mission simulation was
chosen instead to mitigate cost. The objective of the
simulation is to compute the expected value for mission
performance, given a full or semi defined mission map.
For our model a simulation run is defined as follows:
(1) instantiate all mission model entities (devices, users,
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resources, services, and tasks and mission topology) and
define all state variables, (2) generate events based on
probability of compromise associated with each mission
entity, (3) run until steady state is reached for the
expected mission performance of each mission task,
and (4) average mission performance across all mission
tasks to get the expected mission performance for a
given mission.
In addition to mission performance, the mission
performance for each individual mission task is
reported. This information is critical for risk assessment
in the following ways: (1) understanding the mission
task that is most likely to fail can provide insight on
whether the mission should still be attempted, i.e. that
mission task is unimportant and (2) identifying the
mission entities that failed can help determine where
network resiliency techniques should be prioritized to
optimize benefit and reduce cost.

4.

Experiments

The simulation utilized in this experiment is
designed to model how cyber system entity behavior
influences completion likelihood for mission tasks in
order to provide a metric that measures the impact
mitigation tools have on mission performance. The
mission performance model is implemented in NetLogo
[15]. A comparison between mission performance
among a fully defined, semi defined and ill-defined
mission map for an AOC mission is conducted to
demonstrate the models adaptability. It is far more
likely, that a semi-defined or low-defined mission map
is available because techniques to mission map are still
not complete. Additionally, the time associated with
creating a full mission map often is too costly with
respect to mission duration. Comparing semi defined
and ill-defined mission map mission performance to
fully defined performance provides insight into the
accuracy of the metric, and in which instances it is
acceptable to only create semi defined or ill-defined
mission maps as opposed to a full mission map.

4.1.

user 1, device 1, service 1, and resource 1 to mission
task 1. This connection methodology is the same for
the other two mission users because that is what is
depicted in the AOC mission map and is depicted in
Figure 3. Additionally, there are dependent tasks. Task
1 is dependent on Task 0 and Task 2 is dependent on
Task 1. The probability of compromise for users is
0.0833 based on the number of leave days each soldier
has. For both services and devices the probability of
compromise is 0.10 and is derived from [13]. It is the
average POC from a variety of exploitation, and patch
rates with cleaning rate of 25 days. Exploitation rate
is the rate at which an adversary creates and deploys
an exploit. Patch rate is the rate at which exploitations
are discovered and patched. Cleansing rate is the rate
at which the devices and soft wares are updated and
cleaned. The time constraint for each task is 1 day,
and 3 days for the entire mission. Simulation time is
defined such that 1,000 time units = 1 day. Results are
collected from 1,500 Monte Carlo simulation runs that
are terminated after 3,000 time simulation time units.

Figure 3. A full AOC mission map.

Full mission map experimental setup

The AOC mission used in our experiment contains
three mission tasks, three mission users, three resources,
three mission devices, and three services. A full
mission map would provide how each of these entities
are specifically connected and the probability of
compromise associated with each network device. A
complete AOC mission map does not exist, but we
created a predicted full mission model to demonstrate
the mission performance models ability to handle full
mission maps. For this mission map we connect mission

As seen in Figure 3, the mission tasks are represented
in orange, the services in red, devices in green, resources
in violet, and users in blue. Task 1 is dependent on
Task 0 and Task 2 is dependent on Task 1. Unlike
semi-defined and ill defined mission maps, the only
factor that impacts connectivity is the probability of
compromise. If the probability of compromise is
zero for a complete mission map, then the map will
never change because the map is fully supplyed by the
customer.
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4.2.

Semi-defined Mission Map Setup

A semi-defined mission map is a map that has
some elements missing. To mitigate this issue values
are selected from probability distributions to replace
them. The missing elements could represent anything
from unknown values for the probability of compromise
to missing device connections to the network. In
either instance, we assign the missing value with an
expected value based on prior knowledge. For this
AOC semi-defined mission map used in our experiment,
the number of entities is the same as the full mission
map, however we define connectivity as unknown. To
mitigate this, we define a probability of connectivity of
0.60 and define POC as 0.08333. We chose probability
of connectivity to be 0.60 because it is likely that most
military mission entities are set up in the same way
and thus each entity is fairly likely to be connected to
another. For example, if a mission map does not provide
the connections between mission entities, the model
provides a probability of connection that assigns entities
to entities based on that probability. Once assignment
occurs, the mission performance is calculated for 1,500
Monte Carlo simulation runs.

4.3.

Undefined mission map

An undefined mission map is a mission map
that provides the bare minimum of information to
run a simulation.
For example, in our model
the only information known is the mission tasks,
mission users, and the mission constraints. In this
instance, the probability of compromise, probability of
connectivity, and the network must be approximated.
The probabilities for both are drawn from uniform
distribution between 0 and 1. This distribution was
only selected for demonstration purposes. It should be
noted that in an undefined mission map the probability
distribution can be anything with distribution between
0 and 1. A better method may be to estimate the
distribution of available network data with a kernel
density function that best approximates the distribution
and create connections from that distribution. The
outcome for mission performance is significantly tied to
the probabilities selected.

5.

Figure 5 shows the expected mission performance for
the AOC mission for each of the three mission mapping
types.
Table 3. Mission map characteristics and their
resulting mission performance..

Mission
Map
User POC
Device POC
Service
POC
Resource
POC
Connections
Mission
Performance

Full

Semi

Undefined

0.0833
0.1
0.10

0.0833
0.1
0.10

0.0833
[0, 0.5]
[0, 0.5]

0.10

0.10

[0, 0.5]

Known
0.5126

0.60
0.5126

[0,1]
0.2826

As seen in Table 3, the full mission map is
completely known with mission performance score of
0.5126. The semi-defined mission map has POCs
defined for each mission entity, but the network map is
unknown. For this experiment we assumed a probability
of connection for each mission entity to be 0.60. In
practice, this value will be selected based on expert
knowledge or approximation from other similar mission
mappings. Again, for any semi-defined map any of
the categories in Table 3, such as Service POC could
be missing, which would require an approximation.
Because of the high cost associated with false negatives,
we selected a probability of connections that is low
to produce more conservative results. The undefined
mission map has only one constant value for user POC
because their availability is independent of the cyber
network. Everything is unknown which requires a value
to be selected for each POC for each iteration for each
mission entity. Figure 4 below shows the difference in
results for each mission task and each mission mapping.

Results

Table 3 displays the mission performance results and
probabilities of compromise for each mission entity for
each of the three mission mapping types. Figures 4
and 5 provide experimental results for the AOC mission.
Figure 4 show mission performance results for each task
and for each of the three mission mapping types tested.

Figure 4. Mission performance by mission map type
and by task.
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In Figure 4 we give mission performance results for
each of the mission tasks as the expected probability that
the mission task will be completed for three different
mission maps. It is apparent that mission Task 0 had
the greatest variance among its three mission maps as
compared to mission Task 1 and mission Task 2. This
could be due to the task dependencies in the full mission
map which would result in lower mission performances
for Task 1 and Task 2 because they fail every time when
Task 0 fails and when themselves fail.
Additionally, as the level of information a mission
provided decreased, the expected mission performance
also decreased. This is more due to the conservative
values we selected for the values we had to select for the
missing information in the semi defined and ill-defined
mappings. We could have set the missing POC values
to 1 and get great mission performance, but that is
not the intent of the metric. The metric is designed
to provide practitioners with mission centric results.
For missions with low cost, it may be advantageous to
be less conservative in approximating missing values
because of the low risk. We also see that mission Task 2
failed more often than mission Task 0 and Task 1. This
can be explained by the dependency Task 2 has on Task
1 and Task 0.

complete mission mapping remains a complex, dynamic
problem, utilizing a semi mission map and our mission
performance metric may provide satisfactory results
for some missions. Third, the mission performance
is approximately 50% which may be unlikely. As a
means to inform the POCs for incomplete mappings, a
customer may use prior mission performance to better
approximate POCs.

6.

Conclusion

In this paper, we discussed mission mapping and
challenges that exist in mapping missions to network
topologies such as time and money. We also illustrated
that as a result of these challenges there is not a generic
and adaptable metric to measure mission performance.
We developed a novel mission performance metric that
can produce a mission performance for mission maps
that enables flexibility in in the level of information
provided by the input. Our metric also provides
greater specificity and granularity in evaluating mission
performance than current methods by representing
mission performance as a function of mission critical
network entities instead of as a function of the entire
network. In addition to providing a performance metric
for the entire mission, our model enables evaluation at
the mission entity level to provide the user information
on where to focus resources. This metric can be
viewed by users as the expected probability that a
mission will complete. The model is low-cost in both
time and money and provides a quantifiable metric for
practitioners to use in evaluating the defense mitigation
effectiveness and mission resiliency.
Future work is focused on incorporating this mission
performance model into cyber defense evaluation
models to better evaluate cyber defense techniques in
the context of the missions they support.
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